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[Crim. No. 8690. In Bank. Dec. 15, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintift' and Respondent, v. JESSE JAMES ;~
GILBERT and ROBIN CHARLES KING, JR., D~"
fendants and Appellants.
,(,.
(1] 0riminaJ. Law-Evidence-Admissic:ins to Prosecuting 01II.eera.
-Defendant's incriminating statements are inadmissible when.,
obtained in an investigation that was no longer a generalin';~~.;
quiry into an unsolved crime but one focused on a particular;;
suspect in custody by authorities who carried out a process o~,~:~
interrogation that lent itself to eliciting incriminating 8tat&-~·
ments without first effectively infornling defendant of his:
rights to counsel and to remain silent, and no evidence estah- 'c,
lishes defendant's waiver of those rights.
.,!

..

'~

.

[1] See OalJur.M, Evidence, § 397; Am.Jar., Evidence (lat,
ed §§ 6 0 0 - 6 0 2 ) . /
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 448; [3-6] Crim·;
inal Law, § 1382(27); [7] Criminal Law, § 571; [8] Homicide,
§ 267; [9] Criminal Law, § 1440(3); [10-13) Homicide, § 4; [14].
Conspiracy, §8(3); [15] Homicide, § 15(6); [16, 17, 191 Searches''''
and Seizures, § 29; [18] Arrest, § 15; [201 Criminal Law, § 545; , .
[211 Witnesses, § 23j [22] Criminal Law, § 107; [23J Criminal ~,;
Law, §104.5; [24) Robbery, § 23; [25] Criminal Law, § 536(1) ;;;"
[26] Criminal Law, § 1382(23); [27] Criminal Law, § 1382(10);:
[28] Criminal Law, § 52; [29) Criminal Law, § 782; [30] Kid.:j,,~
nap'pg. I§ 7.8; [31) Criminal Lo... §lOlU; [32) J"'1. 1109(7).

'I
\~
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[2] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-Defendant's statemcnts to investigating officers were admitted in violation of his rights to counsel and to remain silent where, at
the time they were made, defendant was under arrest, had been
in custody for four days, had bel'n intl'rrogated three times
concprning a robhl'ry, waR formally chllrged with murder, rohbery and kidnaping, and was taken into an interrogation room
for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements without
being advised of his rights to eounsel or to remain silent.
[8] Id.-Appeal-lteversible Error-Evidence-Admissions. - Defendant's incriminating statemenb, obtained by authorities in
violation of his rights to counsel and to remain silent and
erroneously and prejudicially admitted into evidence were not
merely cumulative of equally damaging admissible statements
volunteered to the booking officer before defendant was formally interrogated where there was evidence that defendant
admitted guilty knowledge of his accomplices' plans to commit
robbery only after prolonged interrogation and the booking
officer did not testify to the details of the volunteered statements but merely to the conclusions he drew from them.
[4] Id.-Appeal-lteversible Error-Evidence-Admissions. - Defendant's trial testimony could not be segregated from his
erroneously admitted and prejudicial statements, obtained by
authorities in violation of his rights to counsel and to remain
silent, to sustain a judgment of conviction where the detailed
statements, including admissions of guilty knowledge, left him
no choice but to attempt to exculpate himself by testifying
that he did not know his codefendant and another intended
robbery.
[5] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Admissions.-Inadmissible statements obtained from codefendant in violation of
his rights to ('\ounsel and to remain silent and his testimony
impelled by their use were not prejudicial to defendant, though
the statements and testimony were to the effect that defendant
planned a bank robbery culminating in murder, where eight
witnesses present at the robbery unequivocally identified defendant as one of the robbers and incriminating evidence was
found in his apartment, including a drawing of the robbery
area with writillg on it identified as defendant's.
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Admissions.-The
erroneous admission into evidence of codefendant's statements,
obtained in violation of his rights to counsel and to remain
silent, and of his trial testimony identifying defendant as the
perpetrator of a robbery CUlminating in murder was not prejudicial on the issue of defendant's death penalty for the murder
of a police officer during the robbery where codefendant's
st~tements and testimony were not reintroduced at the penalty
tnal, the prosecutor did not comment on them, and in nggrava-

\
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tion of the penalty, the prosecutor showed defendant's eden- .
sive criminal record involving a series of armed bank rob-\
beries, as well as the circumstances of the officer's death.
.
[7J Id.-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-Although,in ;
a joint trial of defendant and an accomplice, the prosecution
may not call the accomplice as a witness, an accomplice choosing to take the stand need not limit his testimony to himself;
accomplices are competent to testify for or against each other,
whether they are tried jointly or severally. (Pen. Code,
§§ 1321, 1323.5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1879.)
.[8] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - An instruction that defendants could be convicted of murder for the
killing of their accomplice during a robbery without proof of
malice and solely on the ground that they committed the robbery which was the proximate cause of their accomplice's death
withdrew from the jury the crucial issue of whether the shooting of the accomplice was in response to the shooting of an
officer or solely to prevent the robbery, and denial of defendants' constitutional right to have the jury determine every
material issue presented by the evidence was a miscarriage of
justice within the meaning of Const., art. VI, § 41;'2.
[9] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Regardless of what conclusion a properly
instructed jury might reach on defendant's liability for the
death of his accomplice in a bank robbery, where that death
was a circumstance of the murder of an officer at the robbery
scene, the jury could properly consider in aggravation of the
penalty for the officer's murder the accomplice's death (Pen.
Code, § 190.1), and error in instructing that defendant could
be convicted of murder for the killing of his accomplice without proof of malice, solely on the ground that the robbery was
the proximate cause of the accomplice's death was not prejudicial to defendant on the issue of the penalty for the officer's
murder.
[10] Homicide-Participation in Oifense Resulting in Homicide.To convict defendant of first degree murder for a killing committed by another, the following principle may be invoked:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187), and such malice is implied
under § 1i8 when defendant or his accomplice for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does
an act involving a high degrfle of probability that it will result
in death. Initiating a gun battle is such an act.
[1l] ld.-Participation in Oifense Resulting in Homicide.-For defendant to be convicted of first degree murder for a killing
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 15-21; Am.Jm., Homicide
(let ed § 56).
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committed by another, the killing must be attributable to the
act of defendant or his accomplice.
{12] Id.-Participation in Offense Resulting in lIomicide.-When
defendant or his accomplice, with a conscious disregu:d for
life, intentionally commits an act likely to cause death; and
his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable response to
the act, defendant is guilty of murder, and the killing is
attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony., but
to the intentional act of defendant or his accomplice COlllmitted with conscious disregard of life.
[18] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in lIomicide.-A police officer's killing of anoth-er in the performance of his duty
cannot be considered an independent intervening cause for
which defendant is not liable where the killing is a reasonable
response to the dilemma thrust on the policeman by the intentional act of defendant or his accomplice.
[14] Conspiracy-Criminal-Liability of Coconspirators-Acts in
Furtherance of Common Design. - Under the rules defining
principals in criminal conspiracies, defendant may be guilty
of murder for a killing attributable to his accomplice's act;
but to be so guilty, the accomplice must cause the death of
another human being by an act committed in furtherance of
the common design.
[15] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of
Felony.-When murder is established under Pen. Code, §§ 187
and 188, § 189 may properly be invoked to determine the degree of that murder. Thus, though malice aforethought may
not be implied under § 189 to make a killing murder unless
defendant or his accomplice commits the killing in perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony, when murder is otherwise established, § 189 may be invoked to determine its degree.
[16] Searches and Seizures - Incidental to Arrest - Search of'
Premises.-In a prosecution of codefendants for a bank robbery and the murder of an accomplice and a police officer,
though officers who were pursuing defendant entered his
apltrtment without a warrant, the trial court properly admitted
in evidence articles found therein that connected defendant
with the robbery where the complicity of defendant and his
address were learned from the dying accomplice and offi('ers
found the apartment unoccupied on their arrival.
[17] Id. - Incidental to Arrest - Search of Premises. - A search
without a warrant is reasonable when officers enter in fresh
pursuit of escaping felons to make an arrest.
[18] Arrest-Making Arrest-Making Known Official CharacterFresh Pursuit.-Wh!'re officers entered defendant's apartment,
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, §§ 8-10; Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, §14.

I
I

\
694

PEOPLE t'. GILBERT

[63 C.2d

after a bank robbery and killing of a policeman, not to make
1\ general exploratory search to find evidence of guilt, but in
fresh puriluit to search for a suspect reasonably believed to
be in the apartment and to arrest him, the officers were not
required to demand entrance and announce their purpose (Pen.
Code, § 844) and thus increase their peril by possibly alerting
the suspect.
[19] Searches and Seizures-Incident to Arrest-Search of Premises.-While officers looked through defendant's apartment for
a suspected robber and murderer reasonably believed to be
there, they could properly examine suspicious objects in plain
sight and could properly look for anything that could be used
to identify defendant or his accomplices or to expedite their
pursuit of defendant; thus, evidence obtained through the
search was properly admitted.
(20] Criminal Law - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Writings for Comparison.-Defendant waived any rights he nlight
have had as to use of his handwriting exemplars where they
were made voluntarily after he was advised that he was not
required to say anything without advice of counsel and that
any statements he made might be used against him.
[21] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Self-incrimination-ldenti1ication of Accused.-The privilege against self-incrimination does
not exempt an accused from appearing for identification and
no substantial right is infringed by a police show-up.
[22] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Though
requiring defendant to appear at a police show-up after his
indictment cannot be considered a mere investigation, defendant is not prejudiced by the absence of counsel so long as the
show-up is not designed to elicit information from defendant
or impair his privilege ngainst self-incrimination.
[23] ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery.-Defense counsel can effectively obtain information as to whether police
show-up proceedings were fairly conducted by pretrial discovery of prosecution witnesses and by cross-examination on
the issue of procedt:re employed at the show-up.
[24] Robbery-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-In a prosecution for armed robbery, a weapon found in defendant's possession whc>n arrested but not identified as the one used in the
robbery c(,uld properly be admitted only on the issue of the
minimum penalty. (Pen. Code, §§ 3024, 969c, 1158a.)
[25] CrimfJl.al Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons.-Though when defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 969c, with having been armed at arrest and pleads not guilty,
the jury must determine' whE'thl'T he was armed (Pen. Code,
§ 1158a) , whE'n 11E' stipullltl's to bllving been armed at arrest
for the purpose of thc penlilty, no purpose is servE'd by ad~
lllitting evidenee tbllt be was armed (Pen. Codl', § 1025).

)
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[26] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Demonstrative
Evidence.-Evidenee that a weapon was found in defendant's
possession at the time of his arrest tends to show, not that he
committed armed robbery, but only that he is the sort of person
who carries deadly weapons, and where, in a prosecution for
armed robbery, defendant stipulated to being armed at arre!'t
with a weapon not used in the robbery, the error in admitting
testimony that he was anll£'n at arrest was not prejudicial.
(Const., art. VI, § 4%.)
[27J Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Facts Otherwise
Shown.-Defendant wa!'l not prejudic£'d by evidence that he
was arrested in Philad£'Jphia (as b£'ing too remote to indicate
flight) where th£'re was morc cog£'nt evidence of his flight.
[28] Id.-Defenses-Alibi.-An alibi consists of evidence that defendant was not at the scene of the alleged crime when it was
committed and that he did not otherwise participate in itt;
commission.
[29] Id.-Instructions-Alibi.-In the prosecution for robbery of
a bank, though there was evidence that the bank was about
45 minutes driving time from defendant's apartment, the
apartment manager's admission, on cross-examination, that her
testimony of defendant's asking her for a key more than all
hour after the robbery varied somewhat from her pretrial
statement that defendant might have asked for a key 15
minutes after the robbery merely east doubt on the accuracy
of her testimony and absent evidence of defendant's being
at a place other than the robbery scene at the time of the
robbery, the trial court. properly refused an alibi instruction.
[30] Kidnaping - Evidence: Instructions. - In a prosecution for
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, testimony of the victim
that defendant's grip on her ann was so finn she felt the
illlpression for some time, that she was pushed toward the
door, and that she fell on the sidewalk but was not sure
whether she was pushed down, was not sufficient to show
bodily harm within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 209, and the
trial court did not err in refusing defendant's requested instruction on bodily hann.
[31] Oriminal Law-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-In providing under Pen. Code, § 190.1, for a separate penalty trial
for offenses punished by death or life imprisonment, the
Legislature expressed a preference for one jury qualified to
act throughout the entire case, and this preference does not
deprive defendant of due process or the right of an impartial
jury, since .evidence properly introduced at the trial on the
guilt issue is relevant to determining the penalty.
[32] Jury-Challenges-For Cau¥-Questions as to Death Penalty.-To exclude jurors opposed to the deat.h penalty does not
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favor the prosecution over defendant; defendant has the right ,,-:111
to challenge for cause jurors biased in favor of the death:~
penalty, even though they state they are able to render an ,,*
impartial verdict.

APPEALS ',(one automatically taken under Pen. Code,
from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. H. Burton Noble, Judge. Judgments
as to one defendant reversed; judgment'> as to other defendant, reversed in part and affirmed in part.
§ 1239, subd. (b»

Prosecution for murders of defendants' accomplice and of
a police officer, for robbery and for kidnaping for the purpose
of robbery. Judgments of conviction of one defendant reversed; judgments of conviction of other defendant reversed
as to first degree murder of accomplice and affirmed in all
other respects.
Hugh R. Manes, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
and Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender (Los Angeles), .1.
Stanley Brill and James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendants and Appellants.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants were convicted on two
counts of :first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), one
count of :first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a), and
four counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.
Code, § 209). On each count of :first degree murder, defendant King's penalty was fixed at life imprisonment and defendant Gilbert's penalty was :fixed at death. (Pen. Code,
§§ 190, 190.1.) The trial court sentenced King to prison for
the term prescribed by law on all counts and sentenced Gilbert to death on the two murder counts and to prison on the
remaining counts for the term prescribed by law. King appeals from the judgment of conviction. Gilbert's appeal is
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
ShortlY after 10 :30 a.m., January 3, 1964, defendant Gilbert and Edgar Ball Weaver entered an Alhambra savings
and loan association office, hereafter referred to as a bank,
wearing hats and sunglasses. Gilbert, armed with an automatic pistol, shouted, "Everybody freeze; this is a hold-

',
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up. " He threw a paper shopping bag with the name Alpha
Beta on it at one of the tellers and told her to rul it with
money. Weaver, armed with a revolver, stood by the door and
kept the bank covered while Gilbert forced an accountant to
open the vault and directed the senior teller and the controller to open compartments inside. After obtaining only a box
of rolled coins from the vault, Gilbert retrieved the shopping
bag and began to rul it with money from the tellers'
drawers.
Alhambra Police Officer George Davis, who had been
alerted to the robbery, entered the bank with a shotgun and
disarmed Weaver. Gilbert then grabbed a woman teller and
pushed her toward the door, pointing his pistol at her head
and warning Davis: "Drop that gun and back off or 1'11
shoot the woman." Davis backed toward the front door,
saying, "No you won't; you will never shoot." Officer Billy
Edward Nixon then arrived at the bank in a police car and
saw Officer Davis backing out of the front door with a shotgun. As Gilbert followed Davis out of the bank, he pushed
the woman toward Davis and fired, mortally wounding Davis.
Weaver picked up his revolver and followed Gilbert out of
the bank. As they :fled, Officer Nixon shot and wounded
Weaver.
Gilbert and Weaver escaped in a white automobile. A witness gave the license number to Officer Nixon, and several
bystanders directed him as he pursued the automobile.
Several blocks from the bank a man ran up to Officer Nixon
and told him that two men who seemed to be trying to get"
away from something left a white automobile and entered
another white automobile and continued north on Granada.
Officer Nixon found an unoccupied white automobile with the
license number that had been given to him parked facing
north on Granada. Farther north on the same street he saw a
green automobile that had run over the curb and crashed into
a tree. Weaver was inside, semiconscious and bleeding, with a
revolver on the seat beside him. Weaver died in the hospital
later that evening from a bullet that had entered his back.
Law enforcement officers questioned defendant King about
the robbery' twice on January 5, two days after the robbery,
and again on January 10, when he came to the Alhambra
police station pursuant to la request. On each occasion he
denied knowledge of the robbery. The San Gabriel police
arrested him on February 7, and on February 11 took him to
the Alhambra police station. Upon being told that he was
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being booked on charges of murder, robbery, and kidnaping;~~
King became very talkative and began to disclose his partici- '
pation in the robbery. A police officer told him to wait until
booking had been concluded before making any statements:
He was taken into an interrogation room and during a sevenhour session gave detailed statements about his participation
in the robbery.
King told the officers that he met Weaver at a parole meeting. Although he refused to help Weaver rob a "bookie
joint, " he later accepted Weaver's offer of $100 to steal an
automobile. On the morning of January 3, 1964, King stole a
white automobile and drove it to Los Feliz and San Fer- i
nando Road. A friend followed in King's own white automobile. Gilbert and Weaver arrived in a green automobile at
10 a.m., and King and llis friend followed them to Alhambra.
Gilbert and Weaver parked the green automobile and took
the stolen automobile. For $1,000 King agreed to wait for
them and to drIve Gilbert back to Glendale.
After leaving his friend at a bowling alley, King waited
for Gilbert and 'Veaver. When they returned, Weaver, who
was bleeding badly, got into the green automobile, and Gilbert got into King's automobile with a shopping bag. Gilbert
put a .45 automatic pistol against King's stomach and
threatened to kill him unless he did what he was told.
King drove to Gilbert's apartment in Glendale. On the
way, Gilbert told King that he and Weaver had robbed a
bank. He said that when a policeman entered the bank he
used a woman as a hostage and forced the policeman to back
out the door. He shot the policeman and fired two shots at
another officer who was sitting in a police car. Gilbert said,
"I have killed one cop today, and I will kill a lot more before
I am through." He also said that he thought that Weaver
got in his line of fire and that he had accidentally shot
Weaver.
When they arrived at Gilbert's apartment, King waited
with the shopping bag while Gilbert obtained a key from the
manager. After Gilbert changed clothing, he offered King
$1,000 to drive him to Salt Lake City. When King refused,
Gilbert C{l-me toward him holding a pillow. King heard a clicIt
and realized that a pistol under the pillow had misfired. He
begged for his life, and, after a few moments, Gilbert said
that he was not going to kill him. Gilbert gave King $1,300,
and they left the apartment. King waited while Gilbert returned the key to the manager. They drove to an alley where

Dec. 1965]

PEOPLE tI. GILBERT
(83 Cold 890; 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 185)

699

Gilbert threw his .45 automatic pistol into a garbage can.
They went to a bar, and, shortly after Gilbert met a woman
friend, he allowed King to leave.
King's statements were admitted into evidence at the trial
on the issue of guilt. He contends that they were erroneously
admitted over his objection.
[1] Incriminating statements are inadmissible if they
were obtained when" (1) the investigation was no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to
focus on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody,
(3) the authorities had carried out a process of interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
(4) the authorities had not eiiectively informed defendant of
his right to counselor of his right to remain silent, and no
evidence establishes that he waived those rights." (People v.
Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 353-354 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.01. 1758, 12
L.Ed.2d 977].)
.
[2] King's statements were admitted in violation of this
rule. When King made them he was in custody and the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but had focused upon him. When the police took him
into the interrogation room shortly after 3 p.m. on February
11, their purpose was to elicit incriminating statements. A
short time after the interview began a tape recorder was
started without King's knowledge. At 10 p.m. King was
asked to make a formal tape recording for use in court. When
he refused to do 80 he was asked to dictate a statement to be
used in court. King said that he would make a statement, but
that he would not sign it until he had advice from an attorney. At no time was he advised of his right to counselor
of his right to remain silent. l Accordingly, the statements
should have been excluded.
IOn lImr dire examination, King testi1led that after he waa told of
the charges against him he asked for an attorney and that he made his
statements only after his request was refused. Ria testimony was eon·
troverted, however, b,. the testimon,. of an A1hambra poliee o1licer who
said that King did not ask for an attorney before making hia state·
• ments. The'trial eourt found that King made his statements without
requesting counsel, and, interpreting E.co'beao v. IlliftOiB, 378 U.S. 478,
[84 B.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], to require a request for eounsel (see
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 388, 347-351 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361J), admitted his statements. On the other hand, the eourt excluded
a statement obtained from Gilbert on the ground that he requested
counsel and was denied counsel. Gilbert, who knew of his rights, said
during his interrogation, "1 want an attorne,. present during all my
answers. I know anything I 8&7 is going to be held against me."
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The Attorney General contends, however, that King's
statements were not obtained by a process of interrogationsi
that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements since'
King began voluntarily to disclose his participation in the,
robbery before he was asked any questions and before he was
taken into the interrogation room. We do not agree with this
contention. The statements that were introduced at the trial
were not spontaneous, unsolicited declarations but detailed
statements obtained through a period of prolonged interrogation.
In People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 578 [43 Cal.Rptr.201,
400 P.2d 97], we pointed out that in most cases an interrogation following an arrest will lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements. (See also People v. Bilderback, 62 Cal.2d '
757,761-762 [44 Cal.Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d 921J.) When King
made his statements he was not only under arrest but had
been in custody for four days. He had been interrogated
three times previously concerning the robbery. When the
police formally charged him with murder, robbery and kidnaping, the accusatory stage had been reached. When they
took him into the interrogation room, their purpose was to
elicit incriminating statements, and they had a duty to
advise him of his constitutional rights.
In People v. Cotter, ante, pp. 386, 393, 398 [46 Cal.
Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862J, and People v. Jacobson, ante, pp.
319, 329, 331 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555], we held
that the fact that a defendant is willing to confess and has
already volunteered incriminating statements and confessions
does not absolve the police of the duty to advise him of his
constitutional rights before eliciting further confessions at
stationhouse interrogations. We further held, however, that
error in admitting confessions so elicited in the absence of
such warning is not prejudicial when there are also in evidence equally damaging admissible confessions that were
made before the police improperly elicited the inadmissible
confessions.
[3] In the present case, however, the booking officer did
not testify to the details of what King volunteered before he
was formally interrogated. The officer stated only the conclusions he drew therefrom. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that King's volunteered statements during booking
were not wholly consistent with his testimony at the trial
that he had no knowledge of the planned robbery until after
it occurred. There is evidence, however, that King admitted
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guilty knowledge of the plans of Weaver and Gilbert only
after prolonged interrogation. Thus, King's inadmissible
statements were not merely cumulative of equally damaging
admissible statements.
[4] There is also no merit in the contention that the erroneous admission of King's statements was not prejudicial to
llim because he took the stand and testified to committing the
same acts that he had admitted in his statements. When King
testified, the only evidence other than his statements that had
been introduced to connect him with the crime was a fingerprint identified as his on a shopping bag similar to the one
tllat had been used in the robbery. Since the details of his
,'olunteered statements during booking are not in evidence, it
is impossible to determine whether detailed evidence of those
statements alone would have impelled his testimony. The detailed inadmissible statements, including admissions of guilty
knowledge, clearly left King no choice but to take the stand
and attempt to exculpate himself by testifying that he did
not know that Gilbert and Weaver intended to commit a
robbery. Thus, King's testimony cannot be segregated from
his erroneously admitted statements to sustain the judgment.
(Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91 (84 S.Ct.229, 11
L.Ed.2d 171] ; People v. Davis, 62 Ca1.2d 791, 796 [44 Cal.
Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142]; People v. Ibarra, 60 Ca1.2d 460,
463 [34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487]; People v. Dixon, 46
Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557].) Accordingly, the judgment
convicting King must be reversed.
Defendant Gilbert contends that since King's statements·
and testimony implicated him, the error was also prejudicial
as to him, thereby compelling reversal. In People v. Aranda,
ante, pp. 518, 526 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265], we
held that instructions that an erroneously admitted confession of one defendant implicating his codefendant should be
considered against the former only did not cure the error as
to the latter. We pointed out that "The giving of such instructions, however, and the fact that the confession is only
an accusation against the nondeclarant and thus lacks the
shattering impact of a self-incriminatory statement by him
(see People v. Parham, 60 Ca1.2d 378, 385 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497,
384 P.2d lQOl]) preclude holding that the error of admitting
the confession is always prejudicial to the nondeclarant."
This rule also applies to King's testimony that was impelled
by the err4>neous admission of his statements.
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[6] The dect of King's statements as an accusation',
, against Gilbert was somewhat vitiated by the trial court's ';
instruction that the jury should not consider them as evi. .I
dence against Gilbert. King's testimony was' less damaging
to Gilbert than his statements, and the trial court instructed
the jury that such testimony' must be corroborated and
should be viewed with distrust. Regardless of the efficacy of
these instructions, King's statements and testimony cannot
be considered prejudicial in face of the overwhelming evidence of Gilbert's guilt. Eight witnesses who were present in
the bank unequivocally identified Gilbert as one of the robbers, and incriminating evidence was found in his apartment,
including a drawing of the Alhambra bank area with writing
on it identi1ied as Gilbert's. Under these circumstances, there
is no reasonable possibility that the error in admitting
King's statements and testimony might have contributed to
Gilbert's conviction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2; Faky v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d
171]; People v. 'Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d
243].)
[6] Nor was the admission of King's statements and
testimony at the trial on the issue of guilt prejudicial on the
issue of Gilbert's penalty. At the trial on the issue of penalty
King's statements were not reintroduced, King did not
testify, and the district attorney did not comment upon his
statements or testimony in arguing to the jury. Most of the
prosecution's evidence at the penalty trial was introduced to
sho,v facts in aggravation of. Gilbert's penalty. Gilbert was
convicted in 1947 of second degree murder upon a plea of
guilty for killing a fellow prisoner while serving a term in
San Quentin. He was released on parole in 1959, and convicted of burglary in 1960. He escaped from prison in July
1963, and committed a series of armed bank robberies on
October 28, December 6, December 20, December 23, and December 31, 1963.2 In the face of such facts in aggravation of
the penalty and of the circumstances of the killing of Officer
Davis, the erroneous admission of King's statements at the
trial on thl! issue of guilt was not prejudicial on the question
of Gilbert's penalty. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; Faky v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 186·87 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d
2The trial court instructed the jury to di~regard tllese erimes 1DIlesa
it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that tIll! evidenec est.ablished that
Gllbert was guilty of eommitting them. (8('e People v. TefT1/, 61 Cal.2d
137, 149, In. 8 [87 Ca1.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 881].)
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17l); Peop7e v. Watson l 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d
243].)
Gilbert also contends that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury to disregard King's testimony as
evidence against him, on the ground that such testimony was
not part of the People's evidence and was introduced after
he rested his case. The contcntion is frivolous that the corroborated testimony of 8n accomplice cannot be considered as
evidence against a defendant W]lO is tried separately. (Pen.
Code, § 1111.) Likewise a defendant has no ground to object
to his accomplice's testimony because Jle is tried jointly.
[7] It is true that when the accomplice is also on trial, the
prosecution may not call him as a witness. (Pen. Code,
§ 1323.5.) It does not follow, however, that if he chooses to
take the stand his testimony is limited to himself, for accomplices are competent to testify for or against each other,
whether they are tried jointly or severally. (Pen. Code,
§§ 1321, 1323.5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1879.)8
BQth defendants contend that since their accomplice was
killed by a police officer, the felony-murder doctrine cannot be
invoked to convict them of first degree murder for tllat killing.
(Count II.) In People v. Washington, 62 Ca1.2d 777, 781-782
[44 Cal. Rptr. 442,402 P.2d 130], we he]d that since the purpose
of the common-law felony-murder rule is to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly
responsible for killings they commit, malice aforethought
cannot be imputed under that rule unless a felon commits the
Jdlling. We recognized, however, that entirely apart from the
felony-murder rule, malice may be established when a defendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing
committed by another. [8] Although the evidence in the
present case would support a conviction of first degree murder on the ground that Weaver was killed in response to a
shooting initiated by Gilbert, the court did not instruct the
jury on that ground, but gave an erroneous instruction that
defendants could be convicted of murder for that killing
SA defendant who can abow prejudice from being tried jointly with
others, however, may move for a severance under Penal Code, section
1098. (Cf. People v. Clark, 62 Ca1.2d 870, 883-885 [44 CaJ.Rptr. 784,
402 P.2d 856); People v . ..{ra1ld4l, ante, pp. 518, 529 [47 Cal.Rptr.
353, 407 P.2d 265).) Although each defendant has the benefit of n presumption of innocence and a privilege against self-incriminat.ion, due
process of law does not require that the prosecution rely solely upon
its own proof in establiahing its case.

)
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wit1lOut proof of malice and solely on the ground that they
committed a robbery that was the proximate cause of their;,
accomplice's death. This instruction withdrew from the jury,i
the crucial issue of whether the shooting of Weaver was in·
response to the shooting of Davis or solely to prevent the
robbery. Since defendants have a constitutional right to have·
the jury determine every material issue presented by the evi-.
dellce, the denial of that right was a miscarriage of justice
within the meaning of article VI, section 4% of the California Constitution. (People v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d 722, 730
[31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33], and eases cited.)
[9] Regardless of the conclusion that the jury, properly
instructed, might have reached on Gilbert's liability for the
death of his accomplice, that death was a circumstance of the·
murder of Officer Davis that the jury could properly consider .
in aggravation of the penalty for that murder. (Pen. Code, ~
§ 190.1.) Thus, the error was not prejudicial to Gilbert on the
issue of the penalty for Davis' murder. Accordingly, he is
not entitled to a new penalty trial as to that count.
Since the application of the principles of criminal liability
for a killing committed by another may arise upon King's
retrial, it is appropriate here to define that liability. [10] The I"
following principles may be invoked. to convict a defend- . .
:!t:;r :1irst degree murder for a killing committed by":
(1) Proof of malice aforethought. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought."1
(Pen. Code, § 187.) Such malice is implied under Penal Code ..1
section 188 when the defendant or his accomplice " •for a 1
base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human j
life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability 1
that it will result in death.'" (People v. Washington, 62
Ca1.2d 777, 782 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], quoting .•~
PeopZe v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d 470, 480 [261 P.2d 1] [concur-'
'~4
ring opinion].) Initiating a gun battle is such an act.
[11] (2) The killing m1lst be attributable to the act of
the defendant or his accomplice. [12] When the defendant
or his accomplice, with a conscious. disregard for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his
victim or a police officer kills iin reasonable response to such
act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In such a case, the
killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a
felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his
'. accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.
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[18] Thus, the victim's self-defensive killing or the police
officer's killing in the performance of his duty cannot be
considered an independent intervening cause for which the
defendant is not liable, for it is a reasonable response to the
dilemma thrust upon the victim or the policeman by the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice. (See Hart
and Honore, Causation in the Law, pp. 296-299; Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed.) pp. 270-281.)
[14] (3) Vicarious criminal liability. Under the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies, the defendant
may be guilty of murder for a killing attributable to the act
of his accomplice. To be so guilty, however, the accomplice
must cause the death of another human being by an act committed in furtherance of the common design. (People v.
Schader,62 Ca1.2d 716,731 [44 Ca1.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665] ;
People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881]; People v.
Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 597 [265 P. 230].)
(4) Tlte application of Penal Code section 189. [15] When
murder is established under Penal Code sections 187 and
188 pursuant to the principles defined above, section 189
may properly be invoked to determine the degree of that
murder. Thus, even though malice aforethought may not be
implied under section 189 to make a killing murder unless
the defendant or his accomplice commits the killing in the
perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony (People v.
Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 780-783 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402
P.2d 130J ; People v. Ford, 60 Ca1.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal.Rptr.
620, 388 P.2d 892]), when a murder is otherwise established, .
section 189 may be invoked to determine its degree.
[16] Defendants contend that the trial court erred in admitting evidence illegally obtained by a search of Gilbert's
apartment. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury the
prosecution introduced evidence of the following facts :
Weaver was taken to the hospital shortly after Officer
Nixon found him in the crashed automobile. At the hospital
he told an F.B.I. agent' that he committed the robbery with
a man named Gilbert who lived in apartment 28 of a certain
apartment h\luse on Los Feliz Boulevard in Glendale. Pursuant to a broadcast of this information, agent Kiel located the
apartment house at 1 p.m. When he arrived he saw a man
talking to the manager. After'the man left, Kiel talked to the
'It ill a violation of U.S. Code, title 18. section 2113. to rob a savings and loan aBBociation whose accounts are insured by the federal

lovernment.
83 C.Jd-D
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manager, who told him that Mr. Flood, one of the two men
who rented apartment 28 the previous day, had left just as
he arrived. Kiel relayed this information to agent Schlatter
and several other officers when they arrived 10 minutes later.
Schlatter obtained a key from the manager and the officers
entered the apartment. They found it unoccupied. On the
coffee table Schlatter noticed a notebook with a drawing of
the area of the Alhambra bank. Inside an Alpha Beta shopping bag he found some rolls of coins bearing the name of the
bank. He found an ammunition clip from a .45 caliber automatic pistol, and another agent found on top of a bedroom
dresser an envelope from a photography studio with a photograph of Gilbert inside. The photograpb was shown to bank
employees for identification.
Even though the officers entered Gilbert's apartment without a warrant;1 the trial court properly admitted into evidence the articles found in the apartment and testimony by
iingerprint experts wbo found fingerprints of Gilbert and
'Weaver in the apartment and King's fingerprint on the
shopping bag. A search without a warrant is reasonable when
it is incident to a lawful arrest (Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 [83 8.0t. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726] ; Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399]; People v.
Boyles, 45 Oa1.2d 652 [290 P.2d 535]),· or is justified by a
pressing emergency (People v. Roberts, 47 Oal.2d 374, 377378 [303 P.2d 721] ; see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 454 [69 8.0t. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153]). [17] It is also
reasonable when the officers enter in fresh pursuit of escaping felons to make an arrest.
[18] The officers identified Gilbert and found out where
he lived less than two hours after the robbery. En route to
Gilbert's apartment, agent Schlatter heard over the radio
that three men were suspected of committing· the robbery and
liThe officers later obtained warrants to seize the articles found in the
apartment.
6A search cannot be justified as incident to an arrest unless it is
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the im·
mediate ncWty of the arrest. (.Agnello v. United State" 269 U.S. 20
[46 s.et. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409]; People v. Cf"W!, 61 Cal.2d
861, 865-866 [40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889]; Castaneda v. Superior
Court, 59 Cal.2d 439, 442 [30 Ca'I.Rytr. 1, 380 P.2d 641]; Tompkins v.
Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 65. 67 l27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113];
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 781 [291 P.2d 469].) Therefore, probable
cause to arrest Gilbert is not alone sufficient to justify a search of his
apartment. (See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486·487 [84 S.Ct.
• 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856].)
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that two of them had escaped in the same automohile. When
Schlatter arrived at the apartment, agent Kiel told him that
one of the occupants had just left. Schlatter testified that
"we knew . . . there were three robbers. One was ''I'ounded
and accounted for, one had just left a few minutes before,
and there was a third unaccounted for. Presumably he was in
the apartment." Since the officers were in fresh pursuit of
two robbers who escaped in the same automobile, agent
Schlatter's assumption was not unreasonable. The officers
entered, not to make a general exploratory search to find
evidence of guilt, but in fresh pursuit to search for a suspect
and make an arrest. A police officer had been shot, one suspect was escaping, and another suspect was likely to escape.
Under these circumstances the officers were not required to
demand entrance and announce their purpose (Pen. Code,
§ 844), for to do so might have alerted the suspect and increased the officers' peril. (See Ker v. Oalifornia, 374 U.S.
23, 37-41 [83 8.0t. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726] ; People v. Maddox,
46 Oa1.2d 301, 305.306 [294 P.2d 6].)
The search in the present case is thus different from the
search condemned in Stcmer v. California, 376 U.S. 483 [84
S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 56]. In that case, two days after the
robbery of a food market, police officers identified the defendant as one of the two robbers. Without a warrant, the officers
went to the defendant's hotel where a clerk let them into Ms
room. They had no reason to believe that the defendant was
in his room, for his key was in his mailbox at the hotel desk.
The officers were not in fresh pursuit of escaping robbers..
and they therefore had no reason to believe that the accomplice was in defendant's room. Moreover, they had time to
obtain a warrant. Accordingly, there were no exigent circum.
tances such as existed in the present case to justify the
search.
[19] The search in the present case was also properly
limited to and incident to the purpose of the officers' entry.
While the officers were looking through the apartment for
their suspect they could properly examine suspicious objects
in plain sight. (ReopZe v. Roberts, 47 Oal.2d 374, 378-380
[303 P.2d 721).) Moreover, they could properly look through
the apartment for anything that cOllJd be used to identify the
suspects or to expedite the pursuit. AccordingJy, the ('vidence
obtained through the search was properly admitted.
Defendant Gilbert makes several other contentions that
affect him only.
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[20] Be contends that handwriting exemplars were
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,tained from him by deceit and in the absence of counsel hi ,
violation of the principles of E8cobedo v. lUinois, 878 U.S. '
478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and that the exemplars
were erroneously admitted at the trial along with testimony
based upon them by an expert who identified Gilbert's handwriting on the bank area drawing found in his apartment.
Since we agree with the Attorney General's contention that
Gilbert waived any rights that he might have had before he
made the exemplars, we need not decide whether handwriting
exemplars are properly within the rule of E8cobedo v. lUi"oil, BUpt"4. We' also agree that there is no evidence of improper deception by the authorities.
" .;
F.B.I. Agent Dean arrested Gilbert in Philadelphia on'}
February26, 1964. When Dean attempted to interrogate Gil:- :;:~:
bert about the Alhambra bank robbery, Gilbert refused to;:~
talk until he obtained the advice of counsel. Later that day, 2~
agent Shanahan interviewed Gilbert. Shanahan told him that ';.
he was not required to say anything without advice from an'
attorney and that any statement he made might be used
against him. Gilbert agreed to talk about anything except the
California robbery. Shanahan interrogated Gilbert about rob- ~
beries in Philadelphia in which a demand note had been used '
and he asked Gilbert for a sample of his handprinting. Gilbert:
voluntarily wrote some exemplars. Shanahan testified that he.
obtained those exemplars for the purpose of investigating the
Philadelphia robberies and that they were thereafter filed by \j,'
the F.B.I. in the same manner as fingerprints. Be did not tell oj
Gilbert that the exemplars would not be used in any other
investigation. Thus, even if Gilbert believed that his exemplars would not be used in California, it does not appear that
the authorities improperly induced such belief.
Gilbert further contends that Escobedo requires the exclusion of testimony of witnesses who identified him as one of
the robbers after they attended a police "show-up" in which
he appeared without counsel after indictment.'
We rejected a similar contention in PeopZe v. Lopez, 60
TGUbert a180 contends that he was taken from the jail to the
"show.up" at the polil'e building without authorization in violation of
Penal Code aeetion 4004. The pr08eeution was not required to eatabliBh
aueb authorization a8 n found.ation for t.he testimony of witnesses who
ident.illcd Gilbert, and we nlu~t pr1'8Ume that official duty was regularly
performed. (Code Civ. Proe., • 1963, 8ubd. 15.) Moreover, we see DO
compelling rea80n to adopt an exelu8ionary rule to enforce compliance
witb .eetion '00'.

/
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Oa1.2d 223, 241-244 [32 Oal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16], on the
ground that the purpose of the right to counsel in pretrial
stages is primarily to insure early representation and adequate preparation for trial, and should not be construed to
hinder legitimate police investigation when no substantial
right of the accused is at stake. [21] Since the privilege
against self-incrimination does not exempt the accused from
appearing for the purpose of identification, no substantial
right is infringed by the show-up. The principle of the Lope8
case has not been impaired by Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S.
478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. [22] Although requiring a defendant to appear in a show-up after his indictment cannot be considered a mere investigatory procedure,
the defendant is not prejudiced by the absence of counsel so
long as the show-up is not designed to elicit information from
him or impair his privilege against self-incrimination. The
defendant is required to do no more at a show-up than he
would have to do at trial, and the prosecution may properly
use such a procedure to select witnesses and prepare its case.
"[A]bsent the privilege against self-incrimination or other
privileges provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case
has no 'Valid interest in denying the prosecution access to
evidence that can throw light on issues in the case." (Jones
v. Superior Court, 58 Oa1.2d 56, 59 [22 Oal.Rptr. 879, 372
P.2d 919,96 A.L.R.2d 1213].)
[23] Gilbert contends that counsel is necessary at the
show-up to observe whether the proceedings are fairly conducted. Oounsel can effectively obtain such information, however, by pretrial discovery of prosecution witnesses and by
cross-examination on the issue of the procedure employed
during the show-up.
Gilbert contends that the trial court erroneously admitted
into evidence testimony that he was armed with a concealed
deadly weapon when he was arrested. We agree.
[24] The weapon found in Gilbert's possession when he
was arrested was not identified as the one used in the robbery. (Of. People v. Biser, 47 Oa1.2d 566, 577 [305 P.2d 1];
Pen. Oode, § 12022.) Such evidence could therefore be properly admitted only upon the' issue of the minimum penalty.
(Pen. Oode, §§ 3024, 969c, 1158a.) Penal Oode section 3024
provides for increased minimum penalties when the defendant has in his possession a concealed deadly weapon upon
arrest. [25] When the defendant is so charged under sec-
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tion 969c and pleads not guilty, the jury must determine'
whether he was armed as charged. (Pen. Code, § 1158a.)
When the defendant is willing to stipulate to being armed at
arrest for the purpose of the penalty, however, as in the
present case, no purpose is served by admitting evidence that
the defendant was so armed. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1025.) Moreover, even if the defendant denies being armed upon arrest,
the jury should be instructed that evidence that the defendant was armed when arrested should not be considered as
tending to prove his guilt. [26] Evidence that a weapon
was found in the defendant's possession "tends to show, not
that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of
person who carries deadly weapons." (People v. Biser, 47
Cal.2d 566, 577 [305 P.2d 1].) The error in admitting testimony that Gilbert was armed at arrest, however, was not
prejudicial. (CaI.Const., art. VI, § 4%.)
[27] Gilbert contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he was arrested in Philadelphia, on the
ground that the time and place of his arrest were too remote
to prove llight. There was other more cogent evidence of
1light, however, and Gilbert was not prejudiced by the evi- ,.' i
dence that he was arrested in Philadelphia.
Gilbert contends that the trial court improperly refused to
give an alibi instruction. [28] An alibi consists of evi-' :"
. '.
dence that the defendant was not at the scene of the crime.;
when it was committed and did not otherwise participate in
its commission. [29] No evidence was introduced to show
'
that Gilbert was somewhere else at the time of the robbery.
·.·.·.1
.'...·
The robbery occurred about 10 :45 a.m. on January 3, 1964. .
King testified that it took about 45 minutes to drive from . ,
Alhambra to Gilbert's apartment. The manager of the apart~ "'~~,.
ment house testified that Gilbert asked her for a key between
~,
11 a.m. and 12 noon. Upon cross-examination, the manager
'
said that she thought it was closer to 12 than to 11 when f~i
Gilbert asked her for the key. She admitted, however, that ";1
she previously told the F.B.I. that Gilbert asked her for a"~
key sometimt between 11 a.m. and 11 :30 a.m. Such evidence
did not warrant an alibi instruction. The managE'r's ndmission upon cross-examination that her testimony varied somewhat from the statement sh~ previously gave to the F.B.I.
did not tend to establish that Gilbert was somewhere else
when the robbery occurred. It merely east some doubt on the
accuracy of the manager's testimony. Aecordingly, the trial
'" court properly refused an alibi instruction.

1
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[SO] . Gilbert ~ontends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue
of kidnaping with bodily harm. Section 209 of the Penal
Code provides that when the person kidnaped suffers bodily
harm the penalty shall be either death or life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. Thus, if there was evidence of
bodily harm and the jury had been instructed thereon, it
would not have been limited to choosing between the death
penalty and life imprisonment, but would also have been able
to :fix the penalty at life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. (Of. People v. 8eiterle, 56 Oa1.2d 320 [14 Cal.Rptr.
681, 363 P.2d 913].)
The trial court did not err, however, in refusing to give
Gilbert's requested instruction on bodily harm, since there
was no evidence to support such an instruction. The victim
testified that the grip on her arm was so firm that she "felt
the impressions on that arm for sometime," and that she was
pushed toward the door. Although she fell down on the sidewalk, she was not sure whether she was pushed down, and
there was no evidence that she suffered any injuries in faUing. Such trivial injury is not sufficient to constitute bodily
harm within the meaning of section 209. In People v. Jackson, 44 Ca1.2d 511, 516-517 [282 P.2d 898], we held that the
victim of a kidnaping suffered no bodily harm as a matter of
law, although he was pushed into a sitting position on a
couch and his wrists and ankles were chained so as to impair
the circulation of blood and make some marks on his wrists.
Gilbert contends, however, that "any touching of the person of another against his will with physical force in an
intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or the projecting
of such force against his person" constitutes bodily harm
within the meaning of section 209. (See People v. Tanner, 3
Oa1.2d 279, 297 [44 P.2d 324); Peoplev. Britton, 6 Ca1.2d 1,
3 [56 P.2d 494] ; People v. Brown, 29 Oal.2d 555, 559 [176
P.2d 929]; People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 185 [238 P.2d
1001].) We rejected this definition in the Jackson case, however, and pointed out that in the Tanner case and the cases
following it, the kidnaping victim suffered serious bodily
injury.
Finally, there is no merit in Gilbert's contention that the
trial court improperly excused jurors for cause who stated
upon voir dire examination that they would have been able
fairly to adjudicate guilt even though they were conscientiously opposed to capital punisl1ment. He asserts that SUCll

)
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jurors should have been allowed to serve at the trial on the
issue of guilt and a new jury impaneled if necessary for the
trial on the issue of penalty.
In People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 573-576 [305 P.2d 1], we .
held that it is improper to permit such jurors to serve even
though their exclusion is not compelled by a literal reading
of Penal Code section 1074, subdivision S.8 [31] Moreover,
after our decision in the Riser case, the Legislature adopted
section 190.1, which provides for a separate penalty trial and
states that at the trial on the issue of penalty "the trier of
fact shall be the same jury [as on the issue of guilt] unless,
for good cause shown, the court discharges the jury . . . ."
(Italics added.) Thus, in providing for a separate penalty
trial, the Legislature expressed a preference for one jury
qualified to act throughout the entire case.
Such legislative preference for the same jury at both trials
deprives the defendant neither of due process nor of the
right to an impartial jury. Since all of the evidence properly
introduced at the trial on the issue of guilt is relevant in
determining the penalty (Pen. Code, § 190.1), having the
same jury avoids repetition of evidence and is thus not an
arbitrary requirement. [32] To exclude jurors opposed to
the death penalty does not favor the prosecution over the
defendant, for the defendant has the right to challenge for
cause jurors who have a bias in favor of the death penalty
even though they state that they are able to render an impartial verdict of guilt. (See People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 575
[305 P.2d 1].)
The judgment as to King is reversed. The judgment as to
Gilbert on count II is reversed. In all other respects the
judgments as to Gilbert are affirmed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I concur in affirming the judgments as to Gilbert and I concur in the reversal of count II as to both
defendants under compulsion of People v. Washington
(1965) 62 Ca1.2d 777 [44 CalRptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]. I
8Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A cballenge for implied
bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes, and for JlO
other. • • • 8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the
entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude hiB ji:n.di"'l1
'he defeMant guilty • ••• " (Italics added.)
"
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dissent, however, from the reversal of the other judgments as
to King.
'On the ladder of culpability, King was undeniably several
rungs below his codefendant Gilbert. This factor was considered by the jury in sparing his life while returning a
verdict of death for Gilbert. However, neither a distinction
between the extent of involvement of the two defendants nor
the facts of this case justify reversing King's conviction.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, as it
must be (PeopZe v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 27, 33 [9 Cal.
Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049]), the evidence does not support the
view of the majority that the incriminating statements of
King were obtained when "the authorities had carried out a
process of interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements" (Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S.
478 [84 RCt. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]; PeopZe v. Dorado
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361]).
The prosecution attempted to introduce into evidence
statements made by both defendants. After extensive voir
dire examination outside the presence of the jury, the trial
judge thoughtfully reviewed the facts and the relevant law
on confessions. Gilbert's extrajudicial statements were excluded. As to King, however, the court made a specific oral
finding: "I think the record is straight. The Court has heard
the evidence in this case and is of the opinion that this
defendant did not request counsel; that he had no desire to
have counsel at the time. That the first time that he knew·
that he became suspect in this case it was his desire to make a
complete confession of his involvement in this offense, on his
own volition, and that whatever statement he made, from
evidence I heard, was completely voluntary on his part. . • •
I am not yet prepared to say that a defendant that wants to
'spill his guts,' if I may use that term, and make a complete
confession of a crime, that he cannot be permitted to do so
unless whoever is questioning him goes out and gets him a
lawYer."
Under well-settled rules of law, we are bound by the determination of the trial judge on questions of fact. The trial
court found Dot merely that King did not ask for counsel,
but that he had no desire to have counsel at the time of his
confession. The evidence amply. supports that conclusion.
The majority opinion refers to "a period of prolonged
interrogation" after arrest and during the accusatory stage
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as defined in Dorado. That description is superficiallY8c~ :
curate, but it overlooks the' significant backdrop to this drama.
The tragic crime involved here was committed on January ".
3, 1964. From January 5 on, King knew that he was a 8U8pect, and indeed he had been interviewed by the police three
times. He had more than a month in which to obtain advice
of counsel if he had so desired and having su1Iered two prior
convictions of a felony, he could not have been unaware of
the need for and the right to legal representation. Instead, .
however, he brooded about making a clean breast of his '
involvement, and in fact on one occasion he started for the i
police station with that in mind but lost his nerve en route.
This background makes completely comprehensible his subsequent conduct when, on February 11, he was brought from
San Gabriel, where he was in custody on another matter" to
the Alhambra police department, where he was placed under
arrest on these charges and a process of booking began. During that process King asked Officer Ted Bennett what
charges he faced, and the officer responded that he was being
booked for two counts of murder, one count of robbery, and
one count of kidnaping. Thereupon King became voluble and
freely discussed his participation in the events involved herein.
Officer Bennett did not undertake a process of interrogation,
but on the contrary tried to discourage King from talking
and instructed him to wait until later, for his conversation
was interrupting the booking procedure. Nevertheless, King
persisted and continued to discuss the case. The dialogue
related in the footnote summarizes the event.1
IOn voir dire examination at the trial, 01lieer Bennett made it abundantly clear that King'l statements were voluntary and entirely un·
solicited. In response to questions from the court. the officer testified
&I follows:
., TBB CollltT: You first took him to the booking officer that h&l charge
of the booking, did you'
IITlB WITNESS: Yes, sir.
HTJu: CollltT: With reference to )Oour taking him there, when did he
Itart to talk about thie cue'
IITlB WITNESS: As he was taken to the booking window, he asked
what the cha#ges were. I related the charges, and at that time he started
relating his participation in it.
" THE CollltT: Did you make lome statement to him at that time about
continuing with telling you aboue it until a later time or what!
1ITJu: WITNESS: I asked him on several oeeuions, sir, not to relate
it at that time, to wait until after he '11'&1 booked, but he continued on.
IITBB OOllltT: Now, were you there during the process of the booking'
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
"To OOllltT: And during all the time that he was being-the in·
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The majority emphasizes that the statements introduced in
evidence were not those made by King during the booking
process but were those elicited during the subsequent period
in the interrogation room. I do not consider this to be a
signi1icant distinction, for during this entire period King
sought to relate his story and, indeed, could not be deterred
from doing so. It is understandable that King would choose
to volunteer statements regarding his participation in the
crimes, since it was his purpose to cast the blame entirely on
his codefendant Gilbert. 2 He undoubtedly considered it to
his advantage to relate his version of events before his codefendant talked. That he was so inclined is indicated not
only by his conduct during the booking procedure but by his
earlier start for the police station to confess, frustrated only
by his loss of nerve. He stated several times that he could not
sleep because he was troubled by his conscience, that he
•• wanted to see this guy [Gilbert] busted as much as you."
After several hours in the interrogation room, during
which King related his version of events, he was asked to
prepare a statement and sign it. He recited his story voluntarily and without interruption or interrogation. In fact, one
witness described him as being as resolute as if he were
dictating a novel. I
The tirst time the evidence suggests any reluctance by
King to continue his volunteered narration was his declination to sign the dictated statement. He then added an
formation was being taken by the booking officer, was be making st.ate·
ments wit.h reference to this casef
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, he was.
"THE COURT: And this started as soon as you told him what he was
going to be charged with, is that right!
•• THE WITNESS: Yes.
"THE COURT: All right. Did be continue making this statement during
the booking process'
"THE WITNESS: All through the process, sir."
'The eagerness of King to talk was deemed significant by lIis own
cOUDsel, who stressed it in closing a.rgument to the jury: "You can a.lso
take into consideration the fact that after Mr. King's arrest lIe did try
in all ways that h/1 could to assist the Alhambra police. Now, maybe this
assistance came late; maybe Mr. King was interested in self·preservation
and wanted to keep from being tied into these particular offenses. But
then be did cooperate, and I think that cooperation with the police indicates the possibility of rehabilitation as far as Mr. King is eoncerned."
IThe fol\owmg colloquy was from the testimony of the witness
Luciano:
"Q. There were no instructiops at all during this dictated statement!
"A. No interruptions whatsoever. He sat down lind dictated like be
W8.1 writing a Dovel.'·
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appendage reading as follows: "I make this statement freely'
of my own will, however not being familiar with the laws I
do not feel that lahould sign this confession or make any .
tape recordings of the sattle until I have been advised to do 80
or not by an attorney. The omcers involved did inform. me
prior to making this statement that it could and possibly
would be used in court against me. "
'\',
At the trial, King asserted he had expressed a desire to
phone his girl friend to request her to obtain counsel for him.
But· on cross-examination he admitted that ahe would have
been unavailable during working hours. Furthermore, King
admitted to a witness outside the courtroom during prelimi- \
nary proceedings that he had not asked for a phone call to .,
contact an attorney, but had read of a recent Supreme Oourt
decision in the newspaper about asking for an attorney, and
"you can't blame a guy for trying." In any event, we are
bound by the factual determination of the trial court that he
neither sought nor desired counsel during this period.
J
The majority, by reversing King's conviction merely because Dorado ritual was not recited, apply a parochial
approach to a relatively uncomplicated factual situation. The
police officers could not have given legal advice to King
before he blurted out his incriminating statements at the
booking office; it is evident that efforts to deter his narration
were unavailing. And it is wholly unrealistic, as well as
futile, to require the police to advise a suspect of his right to
counsel after he, of his own volition and without urging or
prompting, takes the initiative to confess. It appears to be of
little consequence that in the instant case King's unsolicited
confession began during the booking process and continued
in an interrogation room. The total circumstances are not as
neatly divisible as the majority opinion chooses to make
them. People v. Jacobson (1965) ante, p. 819 [46 Cal.Rptr.
515,405 P.2d 555], and People v. Cotter (1965) 6nte, p. 886
[46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862]. two cases involving mUltiple
confessions cited by the majority, are inapposite. In both
cases the defendants confessed several times during the investigatory stage, Jater were brought to the police station where
they were interrogated and again confessed. The earlier and
Jater events were clearly distinct as to time, location and
circums\ances. Here, King's incriminatory statement resulted
from one continuous process, all of it the product of his contrite frame of mind. Th~ record is utterly devoid of evidence
luggesting he was imposed UpOD, coerced, persuaded or in-
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duced to relate his criminal experience in any manner other
than his uninhibited inclination dictated.
The evidence, including King's statement, amply supports
his conviction. Therefore, except as to eountlI,I would
a1Hrm the King judgments.
.
McComb, J., concurred.
The petition of appellant Gilbt\rtfor arebearing was denied February 9, 1966.
.
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